socat format _msg function allows format string attack
| socat-format-string (17822) |
Description:
socat is vulnerable to a format string attack, caused by a vulnerability in the _msg function in error.c. A remote or local attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands with privileges of the socat processor or to gain elevated privileges when socat is listening on the UNIX domain socket.
Note: In order to exploit this vulnerability, the socat must log to the syslog using the 'ly command line option.
Consequences:
Gain Access
Remedy:
Upgrade to the latest version of socat (1.4.0.3 or later), available from the socat download Web page. See References.
As a workaround, ensure logging into syslog is disabled.
For Gentoo Linux:
Upgrade to the latest version of socat (1.4.0.3 or later), as listed in GLSA 200410-26. See References.
For other distributions:
Contact your vendor for upgrade or patch information.
References:
- Freshmeat.net Socat Web page: Socat - Stable branch.
- socat download Web page: Index of /socat/download.
- socat Security Advisory 1: Introduction.
- BID-11505: Socat Remote Format String Vulnerability
- CVE-2004-1484: Format string vulnerability in the _msg function in error.c in socat 1.4.0.3 and earlier, when used as an HTTP proxy client and run with the -ly option, allows remote attackers or local users to execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in a syslog message.
- GLSA-200410-26: socat: Format string vulnerability
- SA12936: socat "_msg()" Logging Format String Vulnerability
Platforms Affected:
- Gentoo Linux
- socat socat prior to 1.4.0.3
Reported:
Oct 22, 2004
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