Skype callto: URI handler buffer overflow
| skype-callto-uri-bo (18063) |  High Risk |
Description:
Skype is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow, caused by improper bounds checking of usernames in the URI handler. By creating a callto:// URL with a username containing more than 4096 bytes, a remote attacker could overflow a buffer and possibly execute arbitrary code on the system, once the link is clicked.
Platforms Affected:
- Microsoft, Pocket PC
- Skype, Skype 1.0.0.95 - 1.0.0.98
Remedy:
Upgrade to the latest version of Skype (1.0.0.100 or later), available from the Skype Download Web page. See References.
Consequences:
Gain Access
References:
- Full-Disclosure Mailing List, Tue Nov 16 2004 - 09:01:19 CST, Skype callto:// BoF technical details at http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2004-11/0582.html.
- Skype ChangeLog Web page, 12.11.2004 version 1.0.0.100 at http://www.skype.com/products/skype/windows/changelog.html.
- Skype Download Web page, Download Skype for Windows at http://www.skype.com/products/skype/windows/.
- Skype Web site, Skype - The whole world can talk for free. at http://www.skype.com/.
- BID-11682: Skype Technologies Skype CallTo URI Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
- CVE-2004-1114: Buffer overflow in the handling of command line arguments in Skype 1.0.x.94 through 1.0.x.98 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a callto:// URL with a long non-existent username, a different vulnerability than CVE-2004-1777.
- OSVDB ID: 11786: Skype callto: URI Handler Overflow
- SA13191: Skype "callto:" URI Handler Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Reported:
Nov 15, 2004
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