PHP crypt() function authentication bypass
| php-crypt-authentication-bypass (34601) |
Description:
PHP could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication, caused by a race condition in the crypt() function. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to bypass security restrictions and gain unauthorized access to the vulnerable application.
Platforms Affected:
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 RC1
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 RC3
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 RC2
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 Beta2
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 Beta4
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 Beta3
- PHP, PHP 5.0.0 Beta1
- PHP, PHP 5.0.1
- PHP, PHP 5.0.2
- PHP, PHP 5.0.3
- PHP, PHP 5.0.4
- PHP, PHP 5.0.5
- PHP, PHP 5.1.0
- PHP, PHP 5.1.1
- PHP, PHP 5.1.2
- PHP, PHP 5.1.3
- PHP, PHP 5.1.4
- PHP, PHP 5.1.5
- PHP, PHP 5.1.6
- PHP, PHP 5.2.0
- PHP, PHP 5.2.1
- PHP, PHP 5.2.2
Remedy:
No remedy available as of February 21, 2009.
Consequences:
Bypass Security
References:
- PHP Security Blog, Saturday, May 19. 2007, Suhosin 0.9.20 and crypt() Thread Safety Vulnerability at http://blog.php-security.org/archives/82-Suhosin-0.9.20-and-crypt-Thread-Safety-Vulnerability.html.
- PHP Web site, PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor at http://www.php.net/.
- BID-24109: PHP Crypt Function Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
- CVE-2007-2844: PHP 4.x and 5.x before 5.2.1, when running on multi-threaded systems, does not ensure thread safety for libc crypt function calls using protection schemes such as a mutex, which creates race conditions that allow remote attackers to overwrite internal program memory and gain system access.
- SA25434: PHP crypt() Race Condition Vulnerability
Reported:
May 19, 2007
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