Yoggie Pico Pro and Yoggie Pico runDiagnostics.cgi script command execution
| yoggie-rundiagnostics-command-execution (35208) |
Description:
Yoggie Pico Pro and Yoggie Pico could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system, caused by improper validation of user-supplied input by the runDiagnostics.cgi script. By persuading a victim to visit a specially-crafted Web site, a remote attacker could inject arbitrary shell commands using backtick characters, which would allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system with root privileges.
Platforms Affected:
- Yoggie, Yoggie Pico
- Yoggie, Yoggie Pico Pro
Remedy:
Yoggie Pico Pro and Yoggie Pico customers should contact Yoggie support for upgrade or patch information. See References.
Consequences:
Gain Privileges
References:
- Full-Disclosure Mailing List, Mon Jul 02 2007 - 06:00:31 CDT, Yoggie Pico Pro Remote Code Execution at http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2007-07/0020.html.
- Yoggie Pico Pro Web site, Yoggie Pico Pro at http://www.yoggie.com/node/41.
- BID-24743: Yoggie Pico and Pico Pro Backticks Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
- CVE-2007-3572: Incomplete blacklist vulnerability in cgi-bin/runDiagnostics.cgi in the web interface on the Yoggie Pico and Pico Pro allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the param parameter, as demonstrated by URL encoded ` (backtick) characters (%60 sequences).
- SA25902: Yoggie Pico Pro Shell Command Injection Vulnerability
- VUPEN/ADV-2007-2417: Yoggie Pico Pro runDiagnostics.cgi Remote Shell Command Injection Vulnerability
Reported:
Jul 02, 2007
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