Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX Control-plane Access Control Lists (ACLs) weak security
| cisco-asa-pix-acl-weak-security (42841) |
Description:
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX could provide weaker than expected security, caused by an error in Control-plane Access Control Lists (ACLs). Certain ACLs may not function after initial configuration. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to launch further attacks against the system.
Platforms Affected:
- Cisco, Adaptive Security Appliance 8.0
- Cisco, PIX Security Appliance 8.0
Remedy:
Refer to cisco-sa-20080604-asa for patch, upgrade or suggested workaround information. See References.
Consequences:
Other
References:
- cisco-sa-20080604-asa, Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco PIX and Cisco ASA at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080604-asa.shtml.
- CVE-2008-2059: Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco PIX security appliance 8.0.x before 8.0(3)9 allows remote attackers to bypass control-plane ACLs for the device via unknown vectors.
- SA30552: Cisco ASA and PIX Security Appliances Multiple Vulnerabilities
- SECTRACK ID: 1020182: Cisco PIX Firewall TCP Port 443 Bug in Handling Port Scans Lets Remote Users Deny Service
- SECTRACK ID: 1020183: Cisco ASA TCP Port 443 Bug in Handling Port Scans Lets Remote Users Deny Service
- SECTRACK ID: 1020184: Cisco PIX Firewall May Let Remote Users Bypass Control-plane ACLs
- SECTRACK ID: 1020185: Cisco ASA May Let Remote Users Bypass Control-plane ACLs
- VUPEN/ADV-2008-1750: Cisco PIX and ASA Security Bypass and Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
Reported:
Jun 04, 2008
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