GNU Coreutils pam_succeed_if security bypass
| coreutils-pamsucceedif-security-bypass (43993) |  Medium Risk |
Description:
GNU Coreutils could allow a local attacker to bypass security restrictions, caused by the improper use of the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) pam_succeed_if() function in a configuration file. By sending an "su" command, a local attacker with knowledge of the password could exploit this vulnerability to bypass security restrictions and gain unauthorized access to a locked or expired account.
Platforms Affected:
- GNU, Coreutils 5.2.1
- GNU, Coreutils
- RedHat, Enterprise Linux 4 WS
- RedHat, Enterprise Linux 4 ES
- RedHat, Enterprise Linux 4 Desktop
- RedHat, Enterprise Linux 4 AS
Remedy:
Apply the appropriate update for your system. See References.
Consequences:
Bypass Security
References:
- GNU Web site, Coreutils - GNU core utilities at http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/.
- ASA-2008-364: coreutils security update (RHSA-2008-0780)
- BID-30363: GNU Coreutils 'pam_succeed_if' PAM Local Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
- CVE-2008-1946: The default configuration of su in /etc/pam.d/su in GNU coreutils 5.2.1 allows local users to gain the privileges of a (1) locked or (2) expired account by entering the account name on the command line, related to improper use of the pam_succeed_if.so module.
- RHSA-2008-0780: Low: coreutils security update
- SECTRACK ID: 1020552: coreutils Red Hat PAM Configuration Bug May Let Local Users Gain Elevated Privileges
Reported:
Jul 24, 2008
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